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Two years before the successful D-Day landings of June, 1944, the allies made their first trial of the defenses of the Atlantic coast – with disastrous results. This was the Dieppe Raid, the basic idea of which was to make a seaborne assault of a port within range of fighter aircraft based in Southern England. The plan was simply to take the port, hold it for a day and then pull out. This was clearly stated in the operational orders given to the Canadians in their first World War Two engagement:
‘The 2nd Canadian Division will seize JUBILEE (code name for Dieppe) and vicinity. Occupy the area until demolition and exploitation tasks are completed. Re-embark and return to England.”
The ‘vicinity’ mentioned in the order comprised an 11 mile strip of coast that was flanked by strong German coastal batteries. The task of silencing these batteries was given to the Number 3 and 4 Commando troops.
In choosing Dieppe as the chosen port for this operation, the allies didn’t know what they were in for. The Germans had sealed off all the natural exits from the Dieppe beaches with barbed wire and had sited machine gun positions to cover all approaches with beaten zones of fire. The shingle beaches that the allies would encounter rose in a steady slope that reached to a gradient of 1 in 10. The Dieppe sea front had also been packed with carefully camouflaged guns. This made a direct daylight assault a virtual suicide mission.
Not surprisingly, then, the operation turned into an unmitigated disaster for the allies. On the extreme left flank the landing craft of No.3 Commando had got scattered during an unexpected engagement with five armed German trawlers. The result was that No.3 Commando attacked in piecemeal fashion. They were soon pinned down on the beaches under fierce cross fire. The 2nd Canadian Division fared even worse. As their landing craft launched out at sea and formed up for the run-in, a mix up caused the boats carrying the Canadians to follow the wrong gun boat. They were thus put about 20 minutes behind schedule. This meant that their landing was now in broad daylight at about 0700 hours. They were cut to pieces by the German batteries. Out of 27 officers and 516 men only 3 officers and 57 men were to return to England.
All of the allied landing forces suffered the same fate. The Essex Scottish and Royal Hamilton Light Infantry were pinned down under the sea wall and plastered by deadly mortar fire. Only a few hardy soldiers managed to even got beyond the beaches. The expected tank support failed to materialize. Only ten of the 24 tank landing craft managed to land their tanks and only 28 of the expected 160 tanks got ashore. All of them were lost. The heavy flint shingle of the beaches made it extremely tough going for the tanks. Only three tanks were to make it off the beaches and onto the Esplanade.
The only glimmer of success came from No.4 Commando, on the right flank. They went ashore, according to plan, wiped out the German battery there and pulled out on schedule, on their way home by 0730 hours. They had done exactly as ordered.
At about 0900 hours force commander Major General Roberts began the withdrawal. An hour later rescue boats arrived to pick up the survivors. However, these rescue operations were as disastrous as the initial assault. By early afternoon, though, the fortunate survivors were on their way back to England. By 1740 hours the German Commander in Chief was able to wire his superiors that ‘No armed Englishman remains on the Continent.’ On returning to England one of the survivors sent his own telegram to his wife as follows:
‘Have just returned from a day trip to France. It was very hot and I did not enjoy myself.’
The cost of this failed raid was staggering. The Canadians lost 215 officers and 3,164 men. All vehicles and equipment which had been landed were lost. About 2,000 Canadians were taken prisoner. This amounted to a loss of approximately 50 %. The aircover provided by the RAF also suffered terribly. 106 aircraft were brought down by the Germans in comparison to 48 destroyed and 24 damaged for the Luftwaffe.
Why did the Dieppe raid go so terribly wrong? The reasons were insufficient information, bad communications, and a plan calling for total surprise over a front that was far too wide. The lessons that had to be learnt were crucial; the need for total air superiority, tighter control over the forming up of the landing craft and the need to land sufficient armor to shield the attacking infantry. Fortunately for the allies, when they finally mounted their invasion of the European continent in June, 1944, the lessons of Dieppe had been thoroughly learned.
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